Raw Finance

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Archive for February, 2010

Fixed Income Investors See Moderate Growth But No Change in Unemployment in 2010: Fitch Survey

Posted by Gregg Killoren on February 26, 2010

The results of the most recent Fitch Ratings/Fixed Income Forum Survey published today in the report, ‘Senior U.S. Fixed Income Investors Cautiously Optimistic in 2010, reveal a much improved outlook for the U.S. economy and the credit markets among senior U.S. fixed income investors.

While survey participants do not expect to see a meaningful improvement in the unemployment rate in 2010, a majority still place U.S. GDP growth in a range of 2-3 percent this year.

On the corporate side especially, opinions have turned not just less negative but modestly bullish, with most investors expecting credit improvement over the coming year and a renewed focus on growth-oriented activities.

Among the more constructive responses in the survey were comments on anticipated corporate strategy with mergers and acquisitions and capital expenditures receiving more votes as uses of cash, and defensive measures such as debt amortization or maintaining a cash cushion, receiving less.

By a margin of 3 to 1, U.S. fixed income investors continue to believe that inflation is a greater risk going forward than deflation, but a majority also responded that a weak U.S. dollar is a positive in supporting the U.S. recovery, and that easy monetary policy remains important in 2010.

“Survey responses show that the low interest rate environment offers a challenging mix of good and potentially bad news, but in the near term at least investors see more good in low rates” said Mariarosa Verde, Managing Director of Fitch Credit Market Research.

Along with further improvement in corporate credit quality, investors expect the U.S. high yield default rate to be moderately or significantly lower in 2010, within the context of the 13.7 percent default rate experienced in 2009.

With regard to lending conditions over the next year, most investors believe standards will remain somewhat range-bound either moderately tighter or moderately looser. A very small share believes that standards will loosen in any meaningful way in 2010.

Several opinion trends held steady in the recent survey, including optimism for emerging market growth. Roughly two thirds of investors place emerging market growth at above 3 percent over the coming year. Investors, however, continued to hold the most negative views for Europe, with 50 percent believing that growth in 2010 will fall in a range of 1-2 percent.

In the U.S., opinions surrounding commercial and residential real estate remained bleak; however, less so than in the June 2009 survey.

The full survey, including views on specific asset categories and industry sectors, is titled Senior U.S. Fixed Income Investors Cautiously Optimistic in 2010‘ and is available on the Fitch Ratings’ web site ‘www.fitchratings.com‘ under Credit Market Research.

The Fitch Ratings/Fixed Income Forum Survey, launched in 2005 and conducted twice a year, is designed to provide insight into the opinions of professional money managers on the state of the U.S. credit markets. This most recent edition, the eighth in the series, was conducted in January 2010 and received responses from 109 senior investment personnel across a wide range of institutions.

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Significant Financial Reform Needed to Avoid “Doomsday Cycle”: Economists

Posted by Gregg Killoren on February 25, 2010

In a paper published at VOXeu.com, two economists assert that substantial reform of the global financial industry is necessary to avoid successively greater economic collapses which they have termed a “doomsday cycle.”

Economists Peter Boone, Research Associate, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, and Simon Johnson, Professor of Entrepreneurship, Sloan School of Management, MIT and CEPR Research Fellow, note that, since 1980, the U.S. and other countries have experienced several financial shocks that have been treated by government spending without resolving the underlying causes.  Thus, once the crisis has passed, banks resume risky behavior, and each time a crisis ensues, it is worse than the last.  As countries continue to bailout banks to a greater degree as each crisis comes and goes, the ability of central banks and federal governments to combat the next crisis becomes weaker.  Therefore, in the future, there may be a financial collapse so large, and with governments handcuffed by ballooning deficits from previous bailouts, a “calamitous global collapse” will follow on the scale of the Great Depression.

Boone and Johnson point out, “The doomsday cycle has several simple stages. At the start, creditors and depositors provide banks with cheap funding in the expectation that if things go very wrong, our central banks and fiscal authorities will bail them out. Banks such as Lehman Brothers – and many others in this past cycle – use the funds to take large risks, with the aim of providing dividends and bonuses to shareholders and management.”

But as the crisis eases, and the economy improves, no steps are taken to prevent future excessive risk-taking.  To the contrary, the economists observe that the system encourages banks to take risks. “Through direct subsidies (such as deposit insurance) and indirect support (such as central bank bailouts), we encourage our banking system to ignore large, socially harmful ‘tail risks’ – those risks where there is a small chance of calamitous collapse. As far as banks are concerned, they can walk away and let the state clean it up. Some bankers and policymakers even do well during the collapse that they helped to create.”

The economists recommend major financial reform across three broad areas to be implemented as uniformly as possible across the G-20 nations:

  1. Dealing with regulatory failure – new rules and regulators will not account for the fact that the financial industry has a powerful lobby and the tendency for regulators to come from and flow to the industry being regulated – thus, the best reform is simply to have large and robust capital requirements generally, and, specifically, additional capital requirements for complex financial instruments;
  2. Adjust executive and trader compensation to adjust for long-term risk – bank executives and the traders under them benefited personally by having the banks take on outsized risk, and, although they lost a lot of money in the collapse, that amount paled in comparison to what they earned prior to the collapse – thus, the best reform here is to require “clawback” provisions in compensation contracts that that recoups past earnings and bonuses from employees of banks that require bailouts; and
  3. Tackle the “too big to fail” problem – larger institutions that are more interconnected with financial markets practically required a federal bailout, while smaller institutions were left to fail – this not only puts pressure on taxpayers to foot the bill of a financial collapse, but it also discourages creditors and investors from providing capital to smaller financial institutions – rather than set a hard limit on how large a financial institution can be, it would be better practice to impose rising capital requirements on large institutions over the next five years, which would encourage them (as opposed to ordering them) to develop orderly plans to break up and shrink their banks.

These are reasonable proposals that would not be very complicated to implement.  However, if history is a guide, even if some financial reform is enacted as has been proposed, the underlying causes of the “doomsday cycle” will not be addressed, and we will be left looking for the next calamity to strike.

To view Boone and Johnson’s column at VOXeu.com, please click on the following link: The Doomsday Cycle.

Posted in Banking, Economy, Regulatory Reform | Tagged: , , , | Leave a Comment »

Home Price Declines Easing: December 2009 Case Shiller Index

Posted by Gregg Killoren on February 24, 2010

The S&P/Case Shiller US National Home Price Index declined 3.1 percent in December 2009 from a year earlier. On a month-to-month basis, prices fell 0.2 percent in December from November, but adjusted for seasonal factors the 20-city index was 0.3 percent higher.

“As measured by prices, the housing market is definitely in better shape than it was this time last year, as the pace of deterioration has stabilized for now. However, the rate of improvement seen during the summer of 2009 has not been sustained,” said David Blitzer, chairman of S&P’s index committee.

On a seasonally adjusted basis, just five cities posted month-to-month declines. Unadjusted, 15 regions experienced home-price drops. The housing market is particularly sensitive to seasonal factors, especially in December as the holidays depress activity.  Los Angeles posted the largest jump in prices, while Chicago posted the biggest drop.

“The national picture—while two or three years ago, was one of almost unison, almost every city going up or every city going down—is now a bit more mixed,” Blitzer said in a call with reporters.

Looking at the data on a quarterly basis, one can see that the declines in prices have eased considerably. For the fourth quarter 2009, U.S. home prices dropped 2.5 percent from the fourth quarter 2008. For 2009, quarterly price drops were:

Q1:  19.0 percent
Q2:  14.7 percent
Q3:    8.7 percent
Q4:    2.5 percent

For more information, you are welcome to click on the “Housing Statistics” page on the menu bar above.

Posted in Economy, Housing | Tagged: , , , | Leave a Comment »

Potential Reversal in High-Yield Corporate Bonds Coming: Fitch

Posted by Gregg Killoren on February 23, 2010

In its most recent issue of Leveraged Finance Weekly, Fitch Ratings warns of a potential reversal in high-yield corporate bonds after a strong start to 2010 and a large rally in 2009.  Fitch points out the following ominous signs: in recent weeks fund flows into high yield mutual funds have slowed significantly; several new issues have begun trading below their issue price in the secondary market; and numerous recent deals have been either downsized or pulled from the market altogether.

Of the three signs, perhaps the most telling is investor flows into and out of high yield mutual funds.  During the week ending Wednesday, Jan. 27, 2010, high yield mutual funds experienced the first outflow of funds dating back to mid-August 2009. Although the outflow was small, it followed 22 consecutive weeks of inflows totaling in excess of $8 billion. During the subsequent week ending Wednesday, Feb. 3, 2010, inflows were just barely in positive territory before turning sharply negative (in excess of $1.0 billion) during the week ending Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2010.

The high yield market has had a significant run-up since the first quarter of 2009, with total returns in excess of 50 percent and total new issuance of more than $150 billion during 2009.  However, a recent trend by investors toward less-risky holdings (as of Feb. 10, 2010, money market fund assets stood at approximately $3.2 trillion, according to the Investment Company Institute, down less than 3 percent from $3.29 trillion at the end of 2009, representing a noticeable slow down in outflows to other asset classes) and the specter of higher interest rates seem to have sapped investors appetite’s for high yield bonds.

Posted in Fixed-Income, Investing | Tagged: , | 1 Comment »

Resolution Authority Needed to Solve “Too Big To Fail” Problem: Levitt

Posted by Gregg Killoren on February 22, 2010

Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and a Goldman Sachs adviser, writes in the Wall Street Journal that the Senate should focus on drafting a meaningful financial regulatory reform bill that would address the issues of “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to fail.” A resolution authority, Levitt argues, is the solution. “If a bank or financial institution should require the direction of a resolution authority, failure might not be the only option, but it would remain the first one,” Levitt writes. “That prospect alone would reintroduce the risk of failure in our financial markets.”

To view Levitt’s Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, please click on the following link: Risk and Discipline in the Financial Markets.

Posted in Banking, Regulatory Reform | Tagged: , | Leave a Comment »