Monthly Archives: December 2008

Disinflation/Inflation/Deflation and Fiscal Stimulus: A Look at 2009

On December 12, 2008, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor announced that the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Finished Goods dropped 2.2 percent in November.  This decline follows recent decreases in PPI of 2.8 percent in October and 0.4 percent in September. Food prices were flat and energy prices declined by 11.2 percent.  If one removes the prices for food and energy goods from the equation, as the government likes to do because those prices are considered to be too volatile to rely on them for long-term policy decisions, the PPI increased 0.1 percent.  The other economic news of the day was a report that retail sales fell 1.8 percent in November, a record fifth consecutive monthly decline.

What these numbers are reflecting is that the U.S. economy is experiencing disinflation, and not yet deflation.  There is still inflation (the “core” PPI increased), but its impact is lessening over time, particularly as commodity and energy prices have dropped. Deflation is a condition where the prices of all assets classes decline, usually because the money supply has been restricted.  Part of what makes deflation so devastating to an economy is that it discourages investment.  Imagine a world where every asset one buys almost immediately decreases in value.  In other words, imagine if the only investment option, other than holding cash, was to buy a car.  Wouldn’t one rather hold cash than invest in an asset that immediately loses upwards of 10 percent of its value, and continues to drop over time?  That is what deflation does to investing.  It makes every asset look like a car.

The U.S. economy may be heading toward deflation if the money the U.S. government and other countries have pumped into the financial system does not find its way into the hands of businesses and consumers, or does so at such high cost as to make borrowing unattractive.  The sheer volume of efforts made by governments, and, in particular, those yet to be made by the next U.S. administration, will likely postpone deflation in 2009.  However, central banks will have to shoot their way out of the liquidity trap that has been forming (see my previous post).

Let’s put some quick numbers on this to demonstrate what next year may look like.  Analysts at RGE Monitor calculate that the combination of the negative wealth effect of the drop in housing and a return to the 1990s’ savings rate of approximately 6 percent would result in a decline in consumption over time of more than $1 trillion.  Specifically, if housing prices return to their long-term trend line, that would be roughly a 30 percent drop from peak to trough.  The negative wealth effect from such a drop would subtract approximately $400-500 billion from private consumption over time.  The rebalancing from a debt-oriented consumer to a savings-oriented consumer would reduce consumption by $1 trillion.  A fiscal stimulus plan, like the one outlined by President-elect Obama, that would invest in infrastructure, public services and green technology would greatly help toward offsetting the lost consumption, and since it is not simply pumping money into the financial system, it avoids, and hopefully resolves, the liquidity trap.  However, just to keep the economy limping along, such a program would have to be at least $700 billion.

Even if such a fiscal stimulus package were to be enacted, and it almost certainly will be, we cannot expect that it will end the recession.  But, it will forestall deflation for now.  The hidden danger in such a plan is that it will reinflate the commodity bubble, especially in oil and metals.  In fact, in the recent run-up to what was expected to be an auto industry bailout, oil and iron ore sprang up off their lows.  A spike in commodities next year, along with the large increase in the money supply and low interest rates (probably at zero) would instantly spark inflation, which, in turn, would likely snuff out any economic recovery within a few months.  It would be too soon for the Fed to raise rates to temper inflation because private investment in the economy would not have returned.  Then, in 2010, after the commodity bubble bursts once again, the U.S. economy would turn deflationary, and there would be no stopping it.  This is but one possible outcome, and there are many variables involved, and a change in any one of those variables would have a meaningful effect on the outcome.

What we should be watching next year, then, are the prices of oil and copper.  Both are key elements in any recovery, and with a stimulus plan focused on infrastructure, both will be in demand.  If those prices rise too far and too fast, we will wind up in a “Groundhog Day”-type scenario, where the stock market and commodities prices peak in May/June and then spend the rest of the year falling, just like this year.  The only difference is that the fall will be from a lower high (10,000 to 11,000 on the Dow ones Industrial Average, and $80-100 per barrel of oil) and will result in a much lower low (5,000-6,000 on the Dow, $25-35 per barrel of oil).  Now, on the bright side, if commodities prices manage to move within a reasonable range, the recession may ease, and while the bear market will persist, volatility would come down and thus, the lows of November 2008 would likely represent the bottom.

Sub-Zero Yields on Treasury Bills; Liquidity Trap?

Bespoke Investment Group observed on its blog that the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill Yield recently dropped below zero as investors seeking a safe haven for their cash pile into short-term treasuries.  A yield below zero is the equivalent of lending money to the government, and paying it for the privilege, rather than the government paying you for borrowing your money.  Crazy?  It certainly seems that way.  But maybe the economy will get so bad that paying the government to hold your money will seem like a good idea.  Apparently, to some investors, it already is.

We should not make too light of this situation, however, because it raises the spectre of a something akin to economic quicksand – a liquidity trap.  When nominal interest rates fall to zero (or below), the opportunity cost of holding cash dissipates.  In other words, one might as well literally stuff money in the mattress if one cannot loan money and receive a return on the investment.  Liquidity traps can occur when prices are falling (a deflationary cycle) and the Fed lowers rates to spur borrowing and lending.  No investor wants to buy assets because the prices keep falling, and then, when interest rates fall toward zero, investors and lenders begin hoarding cash, as there is no longer any disincentive (inflation or better opportunity for returns) to holding cash.

One reason we are approaching a liquidity trap now is that our banking industry faces a balance sheet crisis.  Thus, even though the government shifted its goals for the Troubled Asset Relief Program and began investing directly in banks, the financial industry is not using that money to lend.  Part of the reason is that rates are so low and balance sheets so fragile, that banks are hoarding cash to protect themselves.  That is why borrowing rates are not improving (although mortgage rates have come down thanks to a different government program) despite the Fed lowering its federal funds rate to 1 percent and massively increasing the money supply.

Another issue during a period of deflation that adds to the liquidity trap concern is the fact that the real value of nominal liabilities increases and thus, real interest rates increase as the nominal rate trends toward zero.  To put this in clearer terms, imagine you bought a house for $100,000 and have an $80,000 principal balance on a mortgage.  That leaves $20,000 of equity in the asset, the house.  But then housing prices drop, and now your house is only worth $80,000.  The mortgage has not changed and the mortgage interest rate has not changed either.  However, the real value of the mortgage and the interest on the mortgage has gone up, because now you are paying the same amount for an asset that has dropped 20 percent.  In order to regain the nominal equity in the house, it will be necessary to reduce the mortgage principal by $20,000, which is 25 percent of the mortgage and, now, also 25 percent of the value of the house.  Now, let’s say $20,000 falls into your lap from the sky.  You can invest it and earn zero percent, you can pay down your mortgage, or you can hold onto it and wait.  Most consumers in this environment will hoard cash, just like the banks are doing now, until a clear choice can be made, because the other alternatives are too unattractive.  And here is the problem from the macro economic point of view, $20,000 was added to the economy, but it went into the mattress and so, it had no stimulating effect on the economy.

The liquidity trap is why the government needs to refocus away from simply easing access to money and concentrate on fiscal stimulus and, more importantly, restructuring banks’ balance sheets.  I believe the government will take all three of those paths in the coming year, will which spur a temporary improvement in the economy and the stock markets.  But the resulting inflation, continued lack of consumer spending, and lack of a jobs recovery will likely tip the economy into stag-deflation sometime in 2010.  This is when we could see the stock market hit some truly ugly lows (no, we have not seen the worst, but it will look like it is getting much better over the course of the next year—use it to your advantage, but do not be fooled).

By the way, if any of you cash hoarders out there are thinking a money market fund is the best place to be right now, please read this article at Bloomberg.com: Money-Market Fund Yields May Fall to Less Than Zero.

Financials May Face Credit Card Crisis

A white paper by Mathias Kruettli at RGE Monitor predicts total 2009 credit card write-downs by banks to be between $64 billion and $146 billion, compared with $50 billion in 2008. Already crippled by the subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing recession and credit crisis, credit card defaults act like a landmine in the midst of U.S. commercial banks’ path to recovery. And if the write-downs themselves do not represent enough of a threat, then consider the fact that like mortgage-backed securities, credit card portfolios have been widely securitized.

Kruettli points out that, as of September 2008, total nominal outstanding revolving consumer debt, which mostly consists of credit card debt, has reached $970 billon. As layoffs continue to pile up in the U.S. economy, the default rate on credit card debt is likely to increase, forcing banks to charge-off portions of their portfolios. This situation could result in the failure of undercapitalized banks that heavily participate in the credit card market. However, because nearly half of the outstanding credit card debt in the U.S. has been packed into asset-backed securities and sold in the financial markets, it will, once again, be difficult to determine how much of the loss a particular bank would suffer.  Also, due to the securitization of the debt, the damage may not be limited to banks.

Using an econometric model and adjusting for certain variables, Kruettli determined a best-, average-, and worst-case scenario for 2009 credit card write-offs. The average scenario (credit card charge-offs of $100 billion) is twice the 2008 amount of approximately $50 billion.

This is an advance warning to investors that the credit crisis is not over. The crisis that began with subprime mortgage defaults will soon spread to subprime credit cards and probably auto loans as well. This will hit banks at a time when they are using federal funds to recover from the mortgage calamity. How long can the government continue to issue debt and print money to keep the financial industry afloat? I don’t know, but let us hope that it can until financial markets can function on their own, laid-off workers can get jobs, housing prices stabilize (simply stop going down, that is – there likely won’t be an increase for several years), and consumer spending returns (at a sustainable level allowing for household saving).

One final note: anyone considering buying stock in financials should be aware that the top 3 issuers of general purpose credit cards (based on outstanding debt) are not credit card companies, but banks. Those three, in order of outstanding credit card debt are JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup (if the credit card crisis hits hard, I think Citigroup will be sold for its parts). The next three on the list are the credit card companies one would expect: American Express (Amex converted to a bank holding company); Capital One; and Discover Card.

[SOURCE: A Forecast of Write-Downs on U.S. Credit Card Debt in 2009, Mathias Kruettli, RGE Monitor, December 2008]

Managed Funds Do Not Outperform Index Funds

There is building evidence that, over time, actively managed mutual funds do not outperform, and in some cases underperform, index funds.  A recent article in The Economist discusses momentum investing (that is chasing the latest “hot” stock) and investigates why some stocks on occasion move up or down for an extended period of time based solely on “momentum.”  What I found most interesting in the article is the discussion of mutual funds, and the fact that investors chase and leave funds as the funds go through periods of over- and underperformance, respectively.  But this is likely a waste of time, and fund management fees, as all funds, over long time horizons, tend to revert to the median.

In fact, a recent study published by Standard & Poor’s confirms the mutual funds are not worth the costs they charge compared to simply investing in an index fund.  The report concludes that “[o]ver longer time horizons, indicies continue to outperform active managers.”  Specifically, the report demonstrates that over a five-year period ending June 2008, the S&P 500 Index outperformed 68.6 percent of all actively managed large cap funds, the S&P 500 MidCap 400 outperformed 75.9 percent of all mid cap funds, and the S&P Small Cap 600 outperformed 77.8 percent of all small cap funds.

Among other interesting findings in the report is that over 5 years, 26.8 percent of U.S. equity funds, 22.5 percent of global equity funds and 24.7 percent of fixed income funds had been merged or liquidated—and that was before the recent credit crisis-related market crash.  The lesson from the report is that buying into an actively managed fund requires the same amount of effort towards doing one’s homework as buying an individual stock.  Investors must always know what they own.  For those who don’t have the time to do the work, buying into an index fund seems to be the better path to take.

[SOURCE: Standard and Poor's Indicies Versus Active Funds Scorecard, November 12, 2008]

The State of the U.S. Dollar

Lately I have been hearing rumors and anecdotal evidence of an expected collapse in the value of the U.S. dollar, including some doomsday-type scenarios offered by currency traders (hat tip to Steve).  While I generally am not interested in extremist positions (they are inevitably wrong), they are sometimes good indicators that something is wrong.  It’s just that the end of civilation is usually not the result of an economic crisis, and our country endured some shockingly bad crises during its first 50 years of existence.  In this case, I suspect that the concern is how the U.S. government is going to pay for all of the packages and programs it has used and will use in the near future.

The Problem:  Rapid Expansion of U.S. Government Debt

As I noted in the last post, the total outlay of funds by the U.S. government to combat the severe recession in which we find ourselves is at $7 trillion and counting.  To pay for this, the government will issue more 10-, 20- and 30-year treasury bonds.  The more debt the government issues, the more interest it must pay for what it borrows.  The government then has to print money to pay the interest on the debt, because it will not be able to raise taxes until the economy had made a complete turnaround.  Even then, no tax increase will be large enough to repay the debt.  Another option for the government to lower its interest payments is to “monetize” the debt.  Monetizing debt generally means printing money and using those funds to buy back treasury bonds.  We don’t need to get bogged down in the minutia of how a government funds a deficit, my point is that all of these methods increase the money supply.

Expansion of Debt Negatively Affects Factors Involved in the Value of Dollar

If one could create a list of what factors go into the value of the U.S. dollar, or any currency for that matter, I do not believe the list could ever be thorough or accurate enough.  The reason why currencies are traded is because they have no fixed value.  The dollar is only worth what the market believes it is worth, and belief is more of an issue than most might imagine.  To keep our discussion focused, I am going to concentrate on what I, in my humble opinion, believe are three of the most important influences on the value of the dollar: (1) money supply; (2) federal funds rates; and (3) credit default swaps (CDS) prices.

Money Supply

Like most economic transactions, the value of the dollar really comes down to supply and demand.  One reason why the dollar has rallied over the past few months (see chart below) is that we are going through a period of disinflation as asset prices have corrected from all-time highs.  The price of a barrel of oil for example has dropped more than $100 from its peak in June.  As all asset classes have been dragged down, the resulting credit destruction has contracted the money supply.  Even though the government is literally throwing money at the problem, that money is not flowing through to the whole economy.  Also, demand for dollars has risen as foreign investors seek a safe haven from an investing environment where everything is losing value.  Increased demand and decreased supply equal a big rally in the value of the dollar.

[comback kid]

[SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal]

However, the money supply is growing, and once bank lending normalizes, the massive amount of dollars issued by the government will cause inflation.  This eats at the value of the dollar, and will thus reduce demand for the currency.  Increased supply and decreased demand will equal a drop in the value of the dollar.

Interest Rates

The current federal funds rate is 1 percent.  This is low both in nominal and historical terms.  As the government continues to fight the recession, we may see a 0 percent federal funds rate.  Low rates discourage saving and encourage lending.  This practice is another way to increase the money supply.

Credit Default Swaps

CDSs seem to be discussed only in light of mortgage-backed securities.  However, there are healthy markets in CDSs for all kinds of debt, including U.S. Treasuries. One of the offshoots of the rising U.S. government debt may be a concern that the U.S. will have trouble paying off the debt (or as doomsdayers predict, will not be able to pay it off).  When concerns about U.S. default rise, so do prices on CDSs for treasuries.  Usually, the Fed would raise its rates to counter rising CDS rates.  However, if the economy will not allow for that, then the government will need to monetize its debt in order to avoid default, which would be catastrophic to future debt issuances.  Thus, the money supply would increase, and most likely dollar demand would drop sharply.

Prediction

I believe that over the next year or longer, the value of the dollar will steadily decrease, touching or breaking through its previous lows of last Spring for the reasons outlined above.  However, I do not foresee a monumental breakdown in demand for the dollar, if only because the rest of the world is going to be struggling right along with us, and the U.S. will most likely lead the world out of the recession.  Also, it appears that the economic team put together by President-elect Obama will closely monitor the money supply and take action as necessary to ensure that it does not spiral out of control.  Of course, governments by their nature never move fast enough, and that is why I predict that the dollar will give back its current rally.  But, at the same time, I see no reason to buy guns, ammo and canned goods and move to a cabin in the woods.

Anyone who is interested in investing either for or against the dollar may be interested in two exchange-traded funds: PowerShares U.S. Dollar Bullish and Bearish (ticker symbols UUP and UDN).  These funds use currency futures to earn a daily return that mimics the movement of the dollar index.